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We analyze the role of individual’s and spouse’s survival expectations and knowledge about 
Social Security rules on the expected Social Security claiming age, taking into account the 
various incentives faced by single and married individuals. We find that single men and women 
who expect to be long-lived plan on delaying Social Security claiming. When we allow for 
differential effects of survival on knowledge about Social Security rules, subjective survivals 
matter only for single women who are knowledgeable about the penalty associated with early 
claiming. Knowledge is not so important in the decision of single men. The claiming decision of 
married individuals is more complicated, as they are entitled to spouse’s and survivor’s benefits. 
Consistent with the incentives provided by the institution, we find that married men base their 
expected claiming age on their spouse’s survival expectations but not on their own survival. For 
married women, both own and spouse’s subjective survivals influence positively the timing of 
claiming. Knowledge about Social Security rules affects the expected claiming age of both 
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An individual eligible to receive Social Security (SS) benefits may first claim benefits at 
age 62 or may delay claiming benefits until a later age.  By delaying, the individual receives an 
increase in future monthly benefits according to an actuarial adjustment designed to make the 
present value of lifetime benefits constant for a person whose life expectancy is equal to the 
mean life expectancy of a person of that age. Standard economic theory predicts that individuals 
decide to delay claiming of their SS benefits if doing so increases their expected lifetime utility. 
In particular, Life Cycle Models predict that single individuals who expect to be long-lived will 
delay applying for benefits because they perceive the increase in SS benefits they will receive 
from claiming later will be financially beneficial. The claiming decision for married individuals 
is more complicated because spouses are entitled to spouse’s and survivor’s benefits and can 
adopt a joint strategy to maximize the total lifetime amount the couple receives from SS. 
In recent papers, Delavande, Perry and Willis (2006) and Hurd, Smith and Zissimopoulos 
(2004) analyze the effect of subjective survival expectations on the probability of SS claiming 
using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). In their empirical results, Hurd, Smith 
and Zissimopoulos (2004) find a small effect of survival expectations on claiming decisions. By 
using instrumental variable techniques to correct for potential measurement errors in the survival 
expectations, Delavande, Perry and Willis (2006) find larger effects. Coile et al. (2002) address a 
similar question and analyze the effect of survival beliefs on the claiming decision of men by 
using ex-post realized mortality by age 70 to proxy mortality expectations. Because they do not 
have data on expectations, their strategy relies on the assumption that individuals are able to 
forecast their own mortality. They find a large and significant effect of vital status at age 70 on 
delay in claiming after retirement.  
Two important aspects of the decision-making process are over-looked in those studies: 
(1) Individuals will delay claiming when beneficial only if they are aware that delaying claiming 
is associated with larger monthly SS benefits in the future, and (2) Married individuals may take 
into account the survival of both spouses and the benefits of both spouses when deciding to claim 
in order to maximize the lifetime SS benefits received by the couple, rather than by the 
individual. In this paper, we analyze the role of individual’s and spouse’s survival expectations 
and knowledge about SS rules on the decision to claim SS benefits. Our innovation is to take into 
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account the incentives provided by SS to married respondents as well as individual’s knowledge 
about SS rules.  
We take advantage of unique data collected in the HRS 2004 that provide information on 
whether individuals are aware that claiming early reduces benefits: Respondents are asked to 
estimate their expected benefits if they were to claim at age 62 and at their normal retirement age 
(NRA). There has been previous work looking at the role of information in financial decision 
making. For example, several studies have assessed the effects of financial education in the 
workplace on private savings or contributions to pension funds, yielding some evidence that such 
information provision activities have beneficial effects (Bernheim and Garrett, 2003; Lusardi, 
2004; McCarthy and Turner, 2000). Other work is concerned with what individuals know about 
their own pension plans and SS benefits and how this knowledge relates to observed behaviors 
(Mitchell 1988, Gustman and Steinmeier 2001, Chan and Stevens 2004). The conclusion is that 
misinformation and lack of knowledge seem to be widespread. Importantly, Chan and Stevens 
(2004) find that better-informed people are more responsive to the retirement incentives provided 
by their pensions but that lesser-informed respondents are actually responsive to inaccurately 
perceived incentives.  
Using the HRS 2004 data, we find that 46% of respondents report not knowing what their 
SS benefits might be conditional on various claiming ages, and 14% are not aware that their SS 
benefits would be reduced if they claim before their NRA. There are important gender, age, 
education and ethnicity differences in knowledge (and perception of knowledge) about the effect 
of claiming age on the level of benefits. For example, women are much more likely than men 
report that they do not know their expected SS benefits conditional on various claiming ages  
(51% compared to 39% of men).1 Respondents with more education are more likely to report 
their expected benefits and to correctly know the effect of claiming age on benefits than 
respondents with lower education. Black and Hispanic respondents are more likely to report that 
they do not know what their conditional benefits would be than their counterpart. In addition, the 
proportion of black respondents reporting an incorrect effect of claiming age is higher than that 
of non-Blacks (18% versus 13%). The lack of knowledge among underprivileged groups, such as 
                                                 
1 This finding is in line with other work indicating that women display much levels of financial literacy (Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2007). 
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respondents without high-school degree or Blacks, is worrisome as they might rely heavily on SS 
benefits during their retirement.  
Our empirical analysis evaluates the effect of survival expectations on the expected 
claiming age (ECA) reported by respondents in the 2004 HRS. The advantage of using ECA is 
that it is measured simultaneously with the survival expectations and the knowledge of SS rules, 
both of which could evolve through time. We find that single men and women base their 
claiming decisions on their survival probabilities. As predicted by theory, individuals who 
expect to be long-lived plan on delaying SS claiming. Knowledge about the penalty influences 
single men and women differently. Women who know that claiming at 62 reduces SS benefits 
compare to claiming at the NRA –which is the case of 36% of single women – are more likely to 
expect to delay claiming than women who do not answer the questions about expected SS 
benefits and than women who do not know about the penalty for early claiming. Moreover, when 
we allow for differential effects of survival on knowledge, the coefficient associated with 
subjective survival is statistically significant only for women who know about the penalty. For 
men, knowledge about penalty is not statistically significant when estimating expected claiming 
age. Moreover, when we allow for differential effects of survival on knowledge, we find that the 
coefficient of subjective survival is statistically significant for all men who provided their 
expected SS benefits if they were to claim at age 62 and at NRA, independently of whether they 
knew about the penalty, but it is not significant for men who did not answer the knowledge 
question. 
The institutional features for couples are likely to influence the claiming decisions of 
married individuals. In particular, women who tend to be entitled to smaller benefits on their 
own record and who might live longer than their husband may rely heavily on their husband’s 
benefits. A husband’s early claiming will reduce his own benefits and the survivor’s benefits of 
his wife, but not the spouse’s benefits of his wife. A wife’s early claiming for own or spouse’s 
benefits reduces those benefits, but not her survivor’s benefits (Munnell and Soto 2005). We find 
that married respondents are responsive to those institutional features. In particular, married 
men base their expected claiming age on their spouse’s survival expectations but not on their 
own expectations: husbands who expect their wife to be long-lived report a higher ECA. This is 
consistent with the fact that husbands want to maximize the survivor’s benefits that their wife 
will received, which depends on the husband’s claiming age. For married women, however, 
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both own and spouse’s subjective survival has a statistically significant influence on the ECA, 
and the coefficients are positive and of similar magnitude. The fact that, everything else equal, a 
married woman whose husband has higher subjective survival expect to claim later is consistent 
with the fact that she expects to rely on spouse’s benefits (or own), rather than survivor’s 
benefits, for a long period. This spousal (or own) benefits are reduced when a woman claims 
early. We also find that women married to an older husband expect to claim earlier. This result is 
consistent with the fact that those women expect to rely on survivor’s benefits for a longer 
period, which is not affect by their claiming age. Those women probably plan to enjoy reduced 
spouse’s or own benefits for a short period before receiving survivor’s benefits. If we allow for a 
differential effect of survival by knowledge, we find, like for single women, that the coefficient 
of own subjective survival is statistically significant only for women who know about the penalty 
incurred by claiming early. Married men who do not know that claiming early reduces SS 
benefits expect to claim earlier. 
 
I. The data: the Health and Retirement Survey  
The HRS is a nationally representative panel survey of persons born in 1953 or earlier, 
designed to investigate retirement behavior and its implications on the health, social, and 
economic status of the aging population in the US. Various cohorts were enrolled at different 
points in time and were interviewed every two years after enrollment. Spouses of age-eligible 
respondents were also interviewed regardless of age.2  The present paper uses respondents from 
the 2004 wave, which combines the following cohorts: (a) the original HRS cohort of those born 
in 1931 through 1941 and studied since 1992; (b) the AHEAD cohort of those born between 
1890 and 1923 and studied since 1993; (c) the Children of the Depression Age cohort of those 
born between 1924 and 1930 and (d) the War Babies cohort of those born between 1942 and 
1947, both added to the HRS in 1998; and (e) the Early Baby Boomers cohort of those born 
between 1948 and 1953, who were added in 2004. 
1.1. Expected Claiming Age in the HRS 
The HRS asks respondents who do not receive SS benefits the following questions: 
“Do you expect to receive Social Security benefits at some time in the future?” 
If the answer is “YES” then two more questions follow: 
                                                 
2 Source: HRS website at http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu and St Clair et al, 2006. 
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- “At what age do you expect to start collecting these benefits?” ( ___ AGE) 
- “If you start collecting Social Security benefits then, about how much do you expect the 
payments to be in today’s dollars?” ( __ AMOUNT) 
Note that before 2002, only the financial respondent was asked those questions. The financial 
respondents would provide answer both for self and for spouse. In 2002 and onward, the 
question format changed and those questions are now asked to both spouses.  
Table 1 presents the mean and percentiles of the ECA in the HRS 2004. Age 62 is the 25th 
percentile and age 65 is the median and 75th percentile. Those two ages are also the most 
common answers: 33.73% of respondents say 62; 39.79% say 65. Item-non response is relatively 
low. In 2004, 7.8% of the respondents answered “Don’t know” and 0.03% refused to answer. 
                     Table 1: Overview of expected claiming age in HRS 2004 
variable 25th perc. medial 75th perc. mean N 
ECA 62 65 65 64.19225 5,680 
 
Since ECA will be our dependent variable of interest, it is important to evaluate whether it is 
a good predictor of actual claiming age. Rohwedder and Kleinjans (2006) report that people 
update their expectations about claiming age and that ECA are thus more accurate closer to the 
actual claiming date. Table 2 is taken from Rohwedder and Kleinjans (2006) and shows the 
fraction of expected claiming ages reported in an earlier wave (t-1, t-2, ...) that lies within about a 
year of actual receipt. It shows that out of the expectations stated one wave before actual receipt 
around 82% are within a year of the actual claiming age, while out of those stated two waves 
before actual claiming 71% of expectations are within a year of the actual event. This suggests 
that the ECA has a strong predictive power for the actual claiming age.  
Table 2: Percentage of respondents realizing expectations about SS claiming age within one 




1.2 Survival expectations in the HRS 
The HRS has collected subjective probabilities of survival until a target age since its 
baseline in 1992 using the following question: “What is the percent chance that you will live to 
be age [X] or more?”, where the target age X depends on respondents’ age at the time of 
interview. Those questions have been the object of several validation studies focusing on their 
accuracy.  Hurd and McGarry (1995) find that average survival probabilities are very close to 
those presented in life tables and co-vary with variables such as smoking, drinking, health 
conditions or education in ways that would be expected from studies of actual mortality. In a 
more recent paper, Hurd and McGarry (2002) use panel data from HRS and find that respondents 
modify their probabilities in response to new information such as the onset of a new illness. Still 
more recently, Gan et al. (2005) use a combination of subjective survival questions, actuarial life 
tables and actual mortality in the HRS data to estimate individual subjective mortality hazards 
and find that the subjective probabilities play a significant role in accounting for individual 
heterogeneity in mortality hazards.  Other investigators have also made use of the HRS survival 
data to study the accuracy of mortality beliefs (Smith et al., 2001; Siegel et al., 2003) and the 
differential beliefs of smokers and non-smokers (Smith et al., 2001).   
Our analysis uses extensively respondents’ subjective survival probabilities until age 75 
(P75). The advantage of using subjective survival responses is that variables determining health 
and wealth tend to be correlated with mortality expectations, making it difficult in analyses using 
conventional economic variables to identify effects due to expectations alone.  Hurd, Smith and 
Zissimopoulos (2004) argue that the direct measures of survival expectations contained in the 
HRS allow for identification of mortality expectations because, despite being correlated with 
health and wealth, there is much individual variation in expectations which permits identification 
of the effect of mortality expectations on claiming and retirement behavior. 
Figure 1 presents a histogram showing the distribution of P75 for the respondents less 
than 62 years who answered the ECA questions, whom we are going to use in the empirical 
analysis. It shows that respondents exhibit substantial heterogeneity in beliefs. The most 
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II. Knowledge of SS rules 
Individuals will decide their claiming age based on their life expectancy only if they 
know that claiming early influences future SS benefits. Previous work has studied what 
individuals know about their own pension plans and SS benefits and how this knowledge relates 
to observed behaviors. Mitchell (1988) compares workers’ self-reports about the characteristics 
of their pension plans with information obtained from employers and finds that the majority of 
workers are ill-informed.  Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) compare self-reports on expected SS 
benefits and on pension characteristics in the HRS 1992 with estimates of actual entitlements 
derived from matched SS records and from employer-provided information, respectively, and 
conclude that misinformation and lack of knowledge seem to be the norm. Chan and Stevens 
(2004) provide more evidence on heterogeneity in knowledge about pension plans and SS 
benefits, as described by HRS data. They find that among the subsample of respondents 
providing information on expected Social Security benefits, more than three-quarters are 
reasonably accurate in their expected benefit level. They also show that better-informed people 
 8
are more responsive to the retirement incentives provided by their pensions. Importantly, lesser-
informed respondents are actually responsive to inaccurately perceived incentives.  
In this paper, we take advantage of a new question asked in HRS 2004 allowing us to 
evaluate whether respondents are aware that early claiming is associated with future reduced 
benefits. HRS 2004 asks respondents what would be their future SS benefits if they were to 
claim at 62 and at their Normal Retirement Age (NRA). In particular, respondents less than 62 
who reported that they expect to receive SS benefits in the future were asked the following 
questions: 
If you were to start collecting benefits at age 62, what do you think your Social Security benefits 
would be in today's dollars? 
 
If you were to start collecting benefits at your Social Security normal retirement age, what do 
you think your Social Security benefits would be in today's dollars? 
 
In addition, they were asked their expected SS benefits at their reported ECA. Before evaluating 
respondents’ knowledge of SS rules, we present a brief summary of the institutional features (see 
for example Coile et al., 2002 for a more detailed overview). Individuals are eligible to receive 
benefits once they have worked 40 quarters. A non-linear formula is applied on past earnings to 
determine the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) on which monthly benefits are based. If 
individuals claim at the NRA, the monthly benefit equals 100% of the PIA.3 However, individual 
can first claim workers’ benefits at age 62. 4 If they claim between age 62 and their NRA, there is 
an actuarial reduction in the benefit for each month of claiming before their NRA. Thus workers 
whose NRA equals 65 receive a benefit equal to 80% of the PIA if they claim on their 62nd 
birthdays, those whose NRA equals 66 receive 75% of the PIA and finally those whose NRA is 
67 receive 70% of the PIA (e.g, Munnell and Soto 2005). If they claim after their NRA, there is a 
delayed retirement credit. 
Table 3 shows the distribution of expected benefits conditional on claiming at various 
ages. Remarkably, more than a third of the respondents do not know what their SS benefits might 
be. The proportion of “Don’t know” is similar for all the considered claiming ages. Among those 
who report their expected SS benefits, we see that the percentiles of distribution of expected 
benefits conditional on claiming at age 62 are below those of the distribution conditional on 
                                                 
3 The NRA is currently increase progressively from 65 to 67. 
4 They are however subject to an earnings test (see Coile et al., 2002). 
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claiming at NRA, showing that many respondents are aware of the penalty incurred by early 
claiming. We investigate this knowledge more precisely below. 








    
25th perc. 600 700 700 
Median 850 1024 1000 
75th perc. 1200 1500 1400 
mean 916.3466 1173.156 1130.784
N 3,336 3,738 3,660 
    
Don’t know 37.70% 34.52% 34.84% 
Refuse 0.65% 0.71% 0.76% 
 
2.1 Knowledge about whether delaying claiming increases SS benefits  
We use the reported expected SS benefits at various ages to construct a knowledge variable 
measuring whether the respondent knows that delaying claiming increases future monthly SS 
benefits. In particular, we make the following classification: 
o Know if expected SS benefits at NRA> expected SS benefits at 62 
o Mistake if expected SS benefits at NRA<= expected SS benefits at 62 
o Don’t know if the respondents reported “Don’t know/Refuse” for at least one of the 
expected SS benefits at 62 or NRA. 
Table 4 presents the distribution of this measure of knowledge by demographic 
characteristics. Forty-six percent of respondents report not knowing what their SS benefits might 
be conditional on various claiming ages, and 14% are not aware that their SS benefits might be 
reduced if they claim before their NRA. We find important gender, age, education and ethnicity 
difference in knowledge (and perception of knowledge) of SS rules. For example, in this context, 
women are much more likely than men to admit that they do not know the answers to a question. 
We find a gradient by age and education, with respondents having more education and being 
closer to age 62 being more likely to report their expected benefits and to correctly know the 
effect of claiming age than respondents with lower education. Black and Hispanic respondents 
are more likely to report that they do not know what their conditional benefits would be and 
Black respondents are also more likely to report an incorrect effect of claiming age. We also find 
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that a very large proportion of respondents who report a high probability of working past age 62 
are aware of the role of claiming age on benefits. 
 
Table 4: Knowledge of SS rules by characteristics 
  Know Mistake Don't know 
Gender    
Male 46.26 14.78 38.96 
Female 35.09 13.47 51.45 
Education    
lt HS 21.83 14.4 63.78 
HS 39.3 14.89 45.81 
some college 41.67 15.45 42.88 
college + 44.79 11.16 44.05 
Age categories    
lt 50 37.18 17.58 45.24 
50-54 41.25 14.62 44.13 
55-59 42.14 14.54 43.32 
60-62 42.24 11.97 45.80 
Ethnicity (black)    
Non-Black 41.3 13.3 45.4 
Black 28.26 18.00 53.74 
Ethnicity (Hispanic)    
Non-hispanic 40.7 13.92 45.38 
hispanic 28.25 14.56 57.19 
Probability of working 
past age 62 (P62)    
P62<=30 36.36 18.75 44.89 
30<p62<=80 43.94 12.83 43.23 
P62>80 50.25 8.78 40.97 
Total 39.42 13.98 46.6 
 
We investigate the association between demographic characteristics and knowledge in a 
multivariate framework. The first analysis we conduct is a multinomial logit where each of the 
options are “know” “mistake” and “Don’t know.” The second analysis is an ordered logit where 
the latent variable reflects the level of knowledge of the respondents and the ordered variables 
are (1) “know”; (2) answered the questions but made a mistake; (3) did not answer one of the 
expected benefits questions.  
Table 5 presents the results of the multinomial logit. It shows that, even after controlling 
for other factors, gender, education, age and ethnicity are all predictors of SS knowledge. In 
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particular, women, blacks, individuals who are currently working, who have higher earnings and 
higher subjective probability of working past age 65, are more likely to “not know” than to 
“know”. For those who expect to work past age 65, knowing that claiming early reduces benefits 
might not be relevant knowledge. Those with more education, who have a pension, an Individual 
Retirement Account (IRA) and own stock are more likely to know than not. Being black and 
having a college degree have the largest coefficients in absolute value in the mistake equation, 
but have opposite sign with college graduates being more likely to know than to make a 
mistake.5 
Table 5: Multinomial logit with knowledge of SS rules as dependent variable 
  Mistake   Don't know 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value 
female 0.032 0.721  0.542 0.000 
HS -0.314 0.055  -0.641 0.000 
some college -0.306 0.067  -0.723 0.000 
college + -0.546 0.003  -0.534 0.000 
Age -0.019 0.043  -0.012 0.074 
Probability of working past 62 -0.014 0.000  -0.007 0.000 
Probability of working past 65 0.004 0.073  0.005 0.002 
married 0.069 0.501  0.008 0.917 
black 0.53 0.000  0.381 0.000 
hispanic 0.205 0.190  0.29 0.011 
2nd wealth quartile 0.028 0.814  0.015 0.863 
3rd wealth quartile 0.032 0.804  0.083 0.366 
4th wealth quartile -0.017 0.916  -0.019 0.867 
currently working -0.202 0.742  2.473 0.000 
own stock -0.149 0.198  -0.132 0.098 
has pension -0.19 0.065  -0.157 0.033 
earnings 0.00 0.515  0.00 0.037 
IRA wealth above median -0.106 0.278  -0.156 0.024 
Missing pr. of working past 62 -1.392 0.000  -0.096 0.591 
Missing pr. of working past 65 0.984 0.139  2.569 0.000 
constant 1.065 0.193   -1.146 0.031 
      
N= 5,461      
Coefficient associated with KNOW are equal to zero 
 
                                                 
5 Note: the indicator variables for missing P62 and P65 are highly significant because it equals one for a very small 
portion of respondents, most of whom did not provide a correct answer. 
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Table 6 presents similar results using the ordered logit specification. A positive coefficient is 
associated with lower level of knowledge. It shows similar qualitative results than the logit 
specification. 
 
Table 6: Ordered logit with knowledge of SS rules as dependent variable 
  Coef. P>z 
female 0.477 0.000 
HS -0.52 0.000 
some college -0.595 0.000 
college + -0.433 0.000 
Age -0.01 0.102 
Probability of working past 62 -0.006 0.000 
Probability of working past 67 0.004 0.002 
married 0.001 0.990 
black 0.289 0.000 
hispanic 0.245 0.011 
2nd wealth quartile 0.021 0.775 
3rd wealth quartile 0.079 0.323 
4th wealth quartile -0.005 0.961 
currently working 2.438 0.000 
own stock -0.121 0.085 
has pension -0.143 0.024 
earnings 0 0.078 
IRA wealth above median -0.135 0.024 
Missing pr. of working past 62 -0.036 0.827 
Missing pr. of working past 65 2.464 0.000 
N=5,051   
 
2.2 Knowledge about the range of penalty for early claiming  
We can construct a more precise measure of knowledge by looking at the ratio of the 
expected SS benefits if the respondents claim at 62 with benefits if claim at NRA. Table 7 
presents this distribution of implied “penalty” for claiming at 62 rather than at the NRA. The 
median is 80% and the mean 89.2%. The mean and median are relatively accurate, as, depending 
on birth year, the actual ratio is between 75 and 80%. However, we see that a large proportion of 
the respondents have inaccurate perception: the 25th percentile of the penalty is 70% so about 
25% of the respondents overestimate the reduction in SS benefits for claiming at 62, while the 
75th percentile is 100% so another 25% of the respondents are not aware of the reduction.   
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Table 7: Distribution of penalty for claiming at 62 rather than at NRA (100*expected benefits at 
62/expected benefits at NRA) 
variable p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 mean N 
reducSS 60 70 80 100 100 89.18 2911 
 
We use these ratios to construct an additional measure of knowledge, indicating whether the 
reported ratio is very close to the actual one (namely between 60 and 95%), very far (less than 
60% or more than 95%) or whether the respondent does not know. Table 8 presents the 
distribution of this measure of knowledge by demographic characteristics. Only about a third of 
the respondents estimate the penalty to be between 60% and 95%. Table 8 shows similar 
differences in knowledge by gender, age, education and ethnicity than the ones presented in 
section 2.1. 
 
Table 8: Knowledge of penalty for claiming early by characteristics 
  ratio<60 or >95 60<=ratio<=95 Don't know 
Gender    
Male 20.16 40.84 39.00 
Female 18.51 29.89 51.60 
Education    
lt HS 17.24 18.79 63.98 
HS 21.11 32.97 45.91 
some college 20.03 37.03 42.94 
college + 16.69 39.14 44.17 
Age category    
lt 50 22.94 31.74 45.32 
50-54 20.84 34.98 44.18 
55-59 19.62 37.01 43.37 
60-62 16.77 37.30 45.93 
Ethnicity (black)    
Non-Black 18.59 35.90 45.51 
Black 22.46 23.73 53.81 
Ethnicity (Hispanic)    
Non-hispanic 19.13 35.38 45.49 
hispanic 19.30 23.51 57.19 
Total 19.15 34.15 46.7 
 
Table 9 presents a multivariate analysis of this new indicator of knowledge and shows the 
coefficient of a logit estimation. Again, the results are similar to those presented in table 5. 
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Table 9: Multinomial logit with knowledge of penalty for claiming early as dependent variable 
  ratio<60 or >95   Don't know 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value 
female 0.137 0.095   0.587 0.000 
HS -0.149 0.343  -0.606 0.000 
some college -0.310 0.054  -0.754 0.000 
college + -0.410 0.018  -0.535 0.000 
Age -0.019 0.036  -0.014 0.052 
Probability of working past 62 -0.011 0.000  -0.007 0.000 
Probability of working past 67 0.006 0.005  0.006 0.000 
married -0.063 0.503  -0.031 0.684 
black 0.464 0.000  0.406 0.000 
hispanic 0.267 0.069  0.329 0.006 
2nd wealth quartile 0.080 0.467  0.035 0.700 
3rd wealth quartile -0.126 0.291  0.037 0.697 
4th wealth quartile -0.148 0.310  -0.068 0.559 
currently working -0.164 0.777  2.459 0.000 
own stock -0.101 0.331  -0.129 0.120 
has pension -0.041 0.659  -0.127 0.095 
earnings 0.000 0.150  0.000 0.072 
IRA wealth above median -0.036 0.687  -0.143 0.045 
Missing pr. of working past 62 -0.969 0.000  -0.107 0.568 
Missing pr. of working past 65 0.669 0.277  2.569 0.000 
constant 1.167 0.130   -0.923 0.099 
N=5,448           
 
 
III. The determinants of Expected Claiming Age in HRS 2004 
In this section, we evaluate whether survival and our measures of knowledge of SS rules 
influence ECA. By design, Social Security benefits are intended to be actuarially neutral 
regardless of when an individual claim between the early claiming age of 62 and the upper limit 
of age 70.  That is, the level of monthly benefits for a person who delays claiming by a given 
amount of time is increased sufficiently to make the expected present discounted value of the 
annuity stream that he or she will receive invariant to the age of retirement.  This design is 
intended to allow individuals to exercise their preferences for early or late retirement without 
either increasing or decreasing the cost borne by taxpayers in financing the Social Security 
system.  The actuarial adjustment of benefits cannot, however, be truly neutral for the entire 
eligible population (of people with the same earnings histories), if there is individual-level 
heterogeneity in mortality rates.  Individuals who face mortality rates that are higher than 
 15
actuarial rates will, on average, receive lower lifetime benefits than the representative individual 
who retires at the same age and, conversely, those with low mortality risk will tend to receive 
high lifetime benefits. Coile et al. (2002) use financial calculation and expected utility 
maximization simulation and find that delaying claiming can be beneficial and yield large gains 
under various circumstances. 
In our empirical analysis, we focus on respondents who are less than 62 so that all 
respondents have the same set of answers for their ECA (Mechanically, a 65 year-old who has 
not claimed SS benefits cannot report an ECA of 62). Since ECA is an ordinal dependent 
variable, we use an ordered probit model. The independent variables of interested are P75, the 
subjective survival expectations to age 75 (section 1.2), and the indicator of knowledge 
measuring whether delaying claiming increases SS benefits (section 2.2). We also interact P75 
with the measures of knowledge, as we expect P75 to influence claiming age only for 
respondents who are aware that claiming early reduces benefits. Finally, we include basic 
demographic characteristics such as ethnicity, age, education, wealth quartile (we use non-
housing financial wealth where the quartiles are defined separately by marital status), self-
reported health (excellent, very good, good, fair, poor), earnings, working for pay and 
characteristics of the job (white collar, physical), the subjective probability of working past age 
62 and 65, an indicator of IRA wealth (below or above sample median) and finally the SS wealth 
quartiles. The SS wealth quartiles are based on the reported expected Social Security benefits 
elicited from respondents. Note that the expected SS benefit is reported conditional on ECA or 
differing NRA. To make the measure of Social Security wealth comparable across people, we 
compute what would have been the respondent’s benefits if she had claimed at 65 using the 
delayed retirement credit and the reduction of benefits provided by the SS Administration for 
each of the birth years of our respondents.  
Due to the different incentives that couples face compared to singles, and given the 
difference in knowledge by gender, we conduct separate analyses by marital status and sex.   
 
3.1. Single respondents 
3.1.2. Single Women 
Figure 2 present a histogram of the dependent variable of interested. There are two spikes at 62 
and 65 in the reported expected claiming age. The most common answer for single women is 65 
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years old. A few respondents report answers less than 60 years old, showing lack of knowledge 
about SS. About 5% report 60 years old, which is a possible claiming age for widows.   
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 Table 10 presents the results of the ordered probit for single women using ECA as 
dependent variable. The variables of interest are survival expectations to age 75 (P75) and 
knowledge. In the first two specifications, we see that P75 has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient: single women who expect to live longer report a higher ECA. In the 
second specification, the knowledge variables are included. Knowledge has a statistically 
significant effect on ECA: respondents who do not know that claiming at 62 reduces SS and 
those who did not report their expected claiming age are more likely to expect to claim early. 
Note that the effect of survival is small. In specification (2), for a white woman who know about 
the penalty, work in a white collar job, own stock, is in good health, in the second quartile of 
wealth and SS wealth and average values for continuous variables has a 45% chance of claiming 
at age 65 if her subjective survival to age 75 is 60%. This probability increases to 46% if her 
subjective survival is 80%. The effect of knowledge is larger. A woman with average survival 
(67%) who knows that claiming early reduces benefits has a probability of claiming at age 65 
equal to 46%, while this probability drops to 40% if she made a mistake regarding the penalty. 
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In the third specification, we allow for differential effect of survival on knowledge. As 
expected, the coefficient of subjective survival is the largest and statistically significant only for 
women who know about the penalty. So single women clearly make claiming decision based on 
their knowledge of SS rules.  
In all the specifications, the coefficients associated with the other variables are similar. 
There is no statistically significant effect of current health on the ECA. Work expectations are 
important predictors of expected claiming age: women who provide higher expectations to work 
past age 62 and 65 provide a higher ECA. SS wealth influences ECA, with respondents in higher 
quartiles being more likely to expect to claim earlier. Respondents who own stocks are also more 
likely to expect to claim earlier than those who do not. We also find that black women are more 
likely to expect to claim early. 
Table 10: Ordered probit for single women (Dependent variable = ECA in 2004) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
P75 0.004 0.005  
 [0.00]** [0.00]**  
P75 - DK that claiming at 62 reduces SS   0.005 
   [0.20] 
P75 – know that claiming at 62 reduces SS   0.007 
   [0.00]** 
P75 – knowledge question missing   0.003 
   [0.12] 
DKreducSS1==1 - DK that claiming at 62 reduces SS  -0.374 -0.2 
  [0.00]** [0.51] 
DKreducSS1==2 - knowledge question missing  -0.327 -0.048 
  [0.00]** [0.83] 
Age -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 
 [0.39] [0.51] [0.53] 
Black -0.203 -0.191 -0.182 
 [0.03]* [0.04]* [0.05] 
2nd wealth quartile -0.062 -0.063 -0.064 
 [0.57] [0.57] [0.56] 
3rd wealth quartile 0.06 0.059 0.063 
 [0.57] [0.57] [0.54] 
4th wealth quartile 0.096 0.08 0.078 
 [0.46] [0.54] [0.55] 
Working for pay 0.059 -0.061 -0.082 
 [0.96] [0.96] [0.95] 
Own stock -0.233 -0.23 -0.227 
 [0.03]* [0.03]* [0.03]* 
White collar job 0.129 0.117 0.118 
 [0.22] [0.26] [0.26] 
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Physical job -0.056 -0.064 -0.066 
 [0.56] [0.51] [0.49] 
Pension on current job 0.099 0.097 0.092 
 [0.26] [0.28] [0.30] 
Earnings 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.19] [0.18] [0.16] 
Self-reported health –very good 0.117 0.108 0.11 
 [0.30] [0.34] [0.33] 
Self-reported health –good -0.039 -0.027 -0.022 
 [0.73] [0.82] [0.85] 
Self-reported health –fair -0.028 -0.016 -0.013 
 [0.83] [0.91] [0.92] 
Self-reported health –poor -0.112 -0.066 -0.07 
 [0.56] [0.74] [0.72] 
Prob working ft after 62 (P62) 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
Prob working ft after 65 (P65) 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
2nd SS wealth quartile -0.157 -0.199 -0.209 
 [0.19] [0.10] [0.08] 
3rd SS wealth quartile -0.478 -0.528 -0.542 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
4th SS wealth quartile -0.397 -0.406 -0.427 
 [0.01]* [0.01]* [0.01]** 
SS wealth missing -0.43 -0.297 -0.305 
 [0.00]** [0.02]* [0.01]* 
IRA wealth above median 0.067 0.084 0.085 
 [0.44] [0.34] [0.34] 
P62 missing 0.751 0.694 0.694 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
P65 missing 0.035 -0.077 -0.084 
 [0.96] [0.91] [0.90] 
White collar job missing 0.275 0.294 0.293 
 [0.57] [0.55] [0.55] 
Physical job missing -0.72 -0.704 -0.72 
 [0.51] [0.52] [0.51] 
Observations 828 828 828 
P-value in brackets    
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level    
 
3.1.2. Single Men 
Figure 3 presents a histogram of the ECA of single men age 62 or less. 62 and 65 are the most 


















Table 11 presents the results of the ordered probit for single men using ECA as 
dependent variable. In the first two specifications, subjective survival to age 75 has a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient (P-value=0.06) so single men who expect to live longer 
report a higher ECA. In the second specification where we control for indictors of knowledge, 
we do not find an effect of knowledge about the SS penalty due to early claiming on claiming 
age. Moreover, when we allow for differential effect of survival on knowledge (specification 3), 
we find that the coefficient of subjective survival is statistically significant for all men who 
provided their expected SS benefits if they were to claim at age 62 and at NRA independently of 
whether they knew about the penalty, but it is not significant for men who did not answer the 
knowledge question. It seems as if single men act on some rules of thumb saying that they should 
delay if they expect to be long-lived, without having a precise idea of the SS rules that justify 
such a choice. Answering the questions eliciting expected benefits may be associated with being 
aware of the “rule of thumb.” 
In all the specifications, the coefficients associated with the other variables are similar, 
but are slightly different than for single women. Reporting a poor or fair health status is 
associated with an early ECA. A high expectation to work past age 65 is associated with a later 
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ECA. Being in the highest quartile of Social Security wealth is associated with earlier claiming. 
We also find that black men are more likely to expect to claim early. 
 
Table 11: Ordered probit for single men (Dependent variable = ECA in 2004) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
P75 0.004 0.004  
 [0.06] [0.06]  
P75 - DK that claiming at 62 reduces SS   0.01 
   [0.03]* 
P75 – know that claiming at 62 reduces SS   0.006 
   [0.04]* 
P75 – knowledge question missing   -0.001 
   [0.80] 
DKreducSS1==1 - DK that claiming at 62 reduces SS  -0.209 -0.44 
  [0.18] [0.19] 
DKreducSS1==2 - knowledge question missing  0.074 0.476 
  [0.62] [0.09] 
Age 0 -0.001 -0.004 
 [0.98] [0.94] [0.79] 
Black -0.383 -0.376 -0.387 
 [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** 
2nd wealth quartile -0.217 -0.243 -0.278 
 [0.20] [0.15] [0.10] 
3rd wealth quartile 0.115 0.106 0.106 
 [0.44] [0.48] [0.48] 
4th wealth quartile -0.276 -0.298 -0.295 
 [0.16] [0.14] [0.14] 
Working for pay 1.479 1.445 1.441 
 [0.32] [0.33] [0.33] 
Own stock 0.204 0.215 0.211 
 [0.18] [0.16] [0.17] 
White collar job -0.111 -0.11 -0.118 
 [0.42] [0.42] [0.40] 
Physical job -0.074 -0.069 -0.084 
 [0.59] [0.62] [0.54] 
Pension on current job -0.145 -0.15 -0.133 
 [0.27] [0.25] [0.31] 
Earnings 0 0 0 
 [0.69] [0.60] [0.63] 
Self-reported health –very good 0.016 0.035 0.047 
 [0.92] [0.83] [0.77] 
Self-reported health –good -0.123 -0.113 -0.107 
 [0.45] [0.49] [0.51] 
Self-reported health –fair -0.41 -0.389 -0.375 
 [0.03]* [0.04]* [0.05]* 
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Self-reported health –poor -0.68 -0.635 -0.62 
 [0.01]* [0.02]* [0.02]* 
Prob working ft after 62 (P62) 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 [0.27] [0.33] [0.49] 
Prob working ft after 65 (P65) 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
2nd SS wealth quartile -0.28 -0.27 -0.28 
 [0.14] [0.16] [0.15] 
3rd SS wealth quartile -0.342 -0.357 -0.39 
 [0.08] [0.07] [0.05]* 
4th SS wealth quartile -0.419 -0.432 -0.455 
 [0.04]* [0.04]* [0.03]* 
SS wealth missing 0.011 -0.088 -0.13 
 [0.95] [0.65] [0.51] 
IRA wealth above median 0.197 0.194 0.191 
 [0.12] [0.13] [0.13] 
P62 missing 0.328 0.316 0.285 
 [0.36] [0.38] [0.42] 
P65 missing -0.023 -0.041 0.019 
 [0.97] [0.95] [0.98] 
White collar job missing 1.286 1.31 1.388 
 [0.04]* [0.04]* [0.03]* 
Physical job missing -0.25 -0.294 -0.443 
 [0.83] [0.80] [0.70] 
Observations 423 423 423 
P-value in brackets    
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level    
 
 
3.2. Married Respondents  
We now study the claiming age decision of married respondents. Since married 
individuals are eligible to received benefits based on their spouse’s earnings, their incentives are 
different than the ones of single individuals. The institutional features for couples are as follows 
(see Munnell and Soto 2005 for additional details). Married individuals are entitled to 3 types of 
benefits: (i) a benefit based on own earnings record; (ii) a spouse’s benefit bases on spouse’s 
record, equal to 50% of the spouse’s PIA, if that exceeds benefit from own record and (iii) a 
survivor’s benefit equal to 100% of the spouse’s benefit, if that exceeds benefit from own record.  
So a husband’s early claiming will reduce his own benefits and the survivor’s benefits of his 
wife, but not the spouse’s benefits of his wife. A wife’s early claiming for own or spouse’s 
benefits reduces those benefits, but not her survivor’s benefits. Her survivor’s benefits are 
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reduced if she claims survivor’s benefits before her normal retirement, but not if she claims her 
own (or spouse’s) benefits before her normal retirement age.  
Munnell and Soto (2005) highlight the various incentives for couples and show that these 
incentives depend on the relative amount of the spouses’ benefits and on the difference between 
their life expectancy. They show that if a husband expects to die much before his wife, he should 
delay claiming because delaying increases the value of the survivor’s benefits, which at the 
couple-level compensates for the years in which he did not enjoy his benefits. So he should take 
into account the life expectancy of his wife when deciding when to claim, rather than his own. 
As for the wife, her claiming age will affect both her own benefits and the spouse’s benefits she 
is entitled to, but not her survivors’ benefits. Thus, if she expects her husband to die much before 
her, she should claim early to enjoy a reduced amount for a short period of time before receiving 
survivor’s benefits for the longer share of her remaining life. If both spouses have similar life 
expectancy, they will spend their retirement period together. So depending on the ratio between 
spouses’ earning, they should either both wait for their normal retirement age to maximize the 
expected value of the couple’s benefits; or one of them should claim early while the other delays 
as much as possible. The latter is beneficial to couples with similar earnings. 
To investigate whether married respondents are responsive to these institutional incentives, 
we will use the same right-hand-side variables as for single respondents, but will also include: 
(1) Age difference between spouses 
(2) Spouse’s survival expectations 
(3) Record on which respondent expects to claim SS 
(4) Ratio of wife/husband benefits 
 
We review these variables below before including them in our analysis. 
 Age difference between spouses 
For about a third of our sample, spouses have the same age. For the others, men tend to be older 






Figure 4: Age difference between spouses for respondents who answered ECA 
























 Spouse’s P75 
We use the spouse’s perception of own survival to age 75 as an additional right-hand-side 
variable. The underlying assumption is that both spouses share the same perception about their 
survival. The age difference between spouses creates missing spouse’s P75 as only respondents 
less than 65 are asked about P75. Older respondents are asked about other target ages (see table 
12). 
Table 12: Target ages for the subjective survival probability question in HRS 2004 
Age class of 
the respondent Target age 






90 or older None 
 
As a result of these different target ages, spouse’s P75 is missing for about 30% of married 






Table 13: Missing spouse’s P75 by gender 
 Male Female  
Missing spouse P75    
No 1,404 1,537 2,941 
 88.92 69.93 77.87 
    
Yes 175 661 836 
 11.08 30.07 22.13 
    
Total 1,579 2,198 3,777 
 100 100 100 
 
For women, 88% of those with spouse’s P75 missing are married to a husband age 70 or less. 
These husbands were thus asked the likelihood of living to be age 80 (P80). We take advantage 
of the fact that respondents who are less than 65 are asked both about P75 and P80 to predict P75 
given P80 and controlling for a large set of health and demographic factors. Table 14 presents 
the linear regression using P75 as dependent variable and P80 as independent variable. We then 
use the estimated coefficients and the elicited P80 to impute a value for P75 for those husbands 
less than 70 who were not asked their survival to age 75 but answered P80.6 
Table 14: Linear regression using spouse’s P75 as dependent variable 
  Coef. P-value 
P80 0.73 0.000 
Age 0.064 0.107 
Self-reported health –very good -0.478 0.462 
Self-reported health –good -1.481 0.030 
Self-reported health –fair -4.67 0.000 
Self-reported health –poor -9.698 0.000 
GED -1.385 0.250 
HS 2.607 0.001 
some college 2.508 0.002 
college + 3.016 0.000 
female -0.004 0.994 
Black -1.56 0.038 
Non-white / Non-black -2.509 0.005 
2nd wealth quartile 0.593 0.332 
3rd wealth quartile 0.678 0.284 
4th wealth quartile 1.143 0.108 
Constant 24.13 0.000 
N=4730   
R2=0.72     
                                                 
6 If the prediction is above 100, we impute 100. 
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 Social Security Records 
HRS 2004 asks respondents who report that they expect to get SS in the future whether they 
expect to get them based on their own work record only, from a current, previous or late spouse's 
work record only, or both. Table 15 presents the distribution of answers for married respondents 
less than 62 who report an ECA. Men are much more likely to expect to claim on their own 
record only. A third of the women expect to claim on both records and 11% on their spouse’s 
record only. For those, spouse’s survival might be relevant to their own claiming age decision.  
Table 15: Distribution of SS record on which respondents expect to claim by gender 
SS record Men Women Total 
    
R'S OWN RECORD ONLY 86.7 57.01 69.84 
SPOUSE'S RECORD ONLY 0.48 10.67 6.26 
BOTH RECORDS 12.47 30.52 22.72 
DK 0.36 1.76 1.16 
REFUSE 0 0.05 0.03 
    
N 1,684 2,212 3,896 
  
The underlying assumption for including this variable as independent variable is that deciding 
when to claim is sequential. Depending on the earnings history of both spouses, a decision-maker 
decides whether to use her spouse’s record. Given this decision, she will decide when to claim. 
Note that whether we include this variable in the regression or not does not change the other 
coefficients.  
 Ratio of wife/husband benefits 
Due to the incentives highlighted in Munnell and Soto (2005), we also seek to control for the 
ratio of wife/husband benefits. We take the ratio of female and male expected benefits if they 
were to claim at their NRA. If a spouse has already claimed, we use actual benefits rather than 
expected benefits. Unfortunately, since expected benefits at normal retirement age are frequently 
missing, the ratio is missing for many respondents (table 16). 
 26
 











3.2.1 Married Women  
Figure 4 presents a histogram of ECA for married women age 62 or less. For married women, 62 
and 65 are the most common ECA. But, contrarily to single women, 62 is the modal answer. 
Most of the ECA are between 62 and 70, showing that a large proportion of married women have 
knowledge about SS rules.  














Table 17 presents the ordered probit results using ECA as dependent variable. 
Specifications (1), (2) and (3) are the same as for single respondents. In specification (4), we 
introduce spouse’s P75, and in specification (5) we use the imputed P75 for spouses who were 
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not asked P75 but answered their P80. The last specification includes P75 interacted with 
knowledge and spouse’s P75. We find that, for all specifications, higher subjective survival to 
age 75 is associated with delayed claiming and the coefficient is statistically significant. If we 
allow for a differential effect of survival by knowledge, we find, like for single women, that the 
coefficient of own subjective survival is statistically significant only for women who know about 
the penalty incurred by claiming early. Our measures of knowledge are statistically significant in 
all the specifications: women who have incorrect knowledge or who stated that they did not have 
the knowledge are more likely to expect to claim early.  
We find that both spouse’s survival and age difference between spouses are associated 
with a coefficient that is statistically significantly different from zero. So spouse’s P75 does not 
capture fully respondent’s beliefs about her husband’s survival. This is likely due to the fact that 
respondents are not asked directly about their spouse’s life expectancy and that we use the 
husband’s beliefs about his own survival rather than the respondents’ beliefs about her husband’s 
survival. We find that, everything else equal, married women whose husband has a higher 
subjective survival expect to claim later. This is consistent with the fact that they expect to rely 
on spouse’s benefits, rather than survivor’s benefits, for a long period. Spouse’s benefits are 
reduced with early claiming. Women married to older husband tend to expect to claim earlier. 
Again, this is consistent with the fact that those expect to rely on survivor’s benefits for a longer 
period, which is not affected by their claiming age, and that is might thus be beneficial to enjoy a 
reduced benefit as early as possible. Whether we impute for missing spouse’s P75 does not 
change the results. 
Married women who expect to claim on both records also expect to claim later. Again, 
those might count on survivor’s benefits and do not want to incur a penalty for claiming early. 
We do not find a strong effect of the ratio of spouses’ earnings, which is likely due to the fact 
that this variable is missing for many respondents. We just find that women whose ratio is 
between 50% and 99% are more likely to claim earlier than those for whom the ratio is below 
50%, which is consistent with the incentives presented in Munnell and Soto (2005).  
Regarding other variables, we see that work expectations are strong predictor of ECA: 
women who have high expectations to work past age 62 and 65 are more likely to expect to 
claim later. Similarly, women with higher earnings expect to delay claiming, which is consistent 
with the fact that an additional year of work might be advantageous for them. Self-reported 
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health is also a strong predictor, with women who report to be in poor or fair health expecting to 
claim earlier than those in excellent health. Younger women expect to claim later. Finally, SS 
wealth influences ECA, with women in the top quartile expecting to claim earlier. 
 
Table 17: Ordered probit for married women (Dependent variable = ECA in 2004) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
P75 0.003 0.003  0.003 0.003  
 [0.00]** [0.00]**  [0.01]** [0.01]**  
P75- DK that claiming at 62 reduces SS   0.003   0.003 
   [0.25]   [0.28] 
P75 – know that claiming at 62 reduces SS   0.004   0.004 
   [0.02]*   [0.03]* 
P75 – knowledge question missing   0.003   0.002 
   [0.06]   [0.11] 
Spouse’s P75    0.003  0.003 
    [0.01]**  [0.01]** 
Spouse’s P75 missing    0.1  0.099 
    [0.26]  [0.26] 
Spouse’s P75 (with imputation)     0.003  
     [0.01]**  
Spouse’s P75 (with imputation)     0.141  
     [0.12]  
DKreducSS1==1 - DK that claiming at 62 reduces SS  -0.665 -0.576 -0.672 -0.671 -0.602 
  [0.00]** [0.01]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
DKreducSS1==2 - knowledge question missing  -0.19 -0.093 -0.197 -0.193 -0.105 
  [0.01]** [0.56] [0.01]** [0.01]* [0.52] 
Expect SS from spouse's record    0.106 0.108 0.107 
    [0.22] [0.22] [0.22] 
Expect SS on both records    0.191 0.189 0.191 
    [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
DK which record    0.1 0.088 0.1 
    [0.59] [0.63] [0.59] 
ratio wife/husband benefits:50% - 99%    -0.177 -0.16 -0.176 
    [0.06] [0.08] [0.06] 
ratio wife/husband benefits: more than 100%    0.009 0.022 0.009 
    [0.93] [0.83] [0.93] 
ratio wife/husband benefits missing    -0.031 -0.03 -0.029 
    [0.67] [0.67] [0.69] 
Age -0.03 -0.032 -0.032 -0.029 -0.031 -0.029 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
Spouses’ age difference 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.008 
 [0.05]* [0.05]* [0.05]* [0.08] [0.02]* [0.08] 
Black -0.07 -0.021 -0.02 -0.001 -0.005 0 
 [0.41] [0.80] [0.82] [0.99] [0.95] [1.00] 
Hispanic -0.055 -0.038 -0.04 -0.034 -0.042 -0.036 
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 [0.54] [0.67] [0.65] [0.70] [0.64] [0.69] 
2nd wealth quartile -0.073 -0.066 -0.065 -0.069 -0.067 -0.068 
 [0.28] [0.33] [0.34] [0.31] [0.32] [0.32] 
3rd wealth quartile -0.083 -0.076 -0.075 -0.079 -0.079 -0.078 
 [0.26] [0.31] [0.32] [0.30] [0.29] [0.30] 
4th wealth quartile -0.087 -0.093 -0.091 -0.099 -0.103 -0.097 
 [0.33] [0.30] [0.31] [0.27] [0.25] [0.28] 
Working for pay 1.709 1.642 1.691 1.808 1.786 1.852 
 [0.07] [0.09] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] 
Own stock 0.053 0.037 0.038 0.024 0.03 0.025 
 [0.38] [0.55] [0.54] [0.70] [0.63] [0.69] 
White collar job 0.134 0.122 0.122 0.112 0.109 0.112 
 [0.07] [0.10] [0.10] [0.13] [0.14] [0.13] 
Physical job -0.004 -0.01 -0.01 -0.022 -0.02 -0.022 
 [0.95] [0.88] [0.88] [0.74] [0.76] [0.75] 
Pension on current job -0.085 -0.09 -0.089 -0.075 -0.075 -0.075 
 [0.16] [0.14] [0.14] [0.22] [0.22] [0.22] 
Earnings 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.00]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
Self-reported health –very good -0.099 -0.122 -0.123 -0.133 -0.131 -0.134 
 [0.14] [0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]* 
Self-reported health –good -0.084 -0.113 -0.113 -0.109 -0.109 -0.109 
 [0.25] [0.13] [0.13] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] 
Self-reported health –fair -0.281 -0.305 -0.303 -0.307 -0.304 -0.306 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
Self-reported health –poor -1.04 -1.05 -1.054 -1.063 -1.056 -1.066 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
Prob working ft after 62 (P62) 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
Prob working ft after 65 (P65) 0.009 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
2nd SS wealth quartile -0.061 -0.08 -0.081 -0.055 -0.059 -0.056 
 [0.43] [0.30] [0.29] [0.49] [0.45] [0.48] 
3rd SS wealth quartile -0.38 -0.391 -0.395 -0.355 -0.36 -0.358 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
4th SS wealth quartile -0.327 -0.348 -0.353 -0.335 -0.339 -0.34 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
SS wealth missing -0.106 -0.108 -0.111 -0.118 -0.119 -0.12 
 [0.10] [0.17] [0.16] [0.14] [0.14] [0.13] 
IRA wealth above median 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.054 0.055 0.053 
 [0.30] [0.30] [0.30] [0.32] [0.31] [0.32] 
P62 missing 0.639 0.549 0.553 0.545 0.539 0.549 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
P65 missing 0.85 0.875 0.885 0.971 0.976 0.982 
 [0.05] [0.05]* [0.04]* [0.03]* [0.03]* [0.03]* 
White collar job missing 0.107 0.204 0.207 0.169 0.156 0.172 
 [0.75] [0.54] [0.54] [0.61] [0.64] [0.61] 
Physical job missing 0.424 0.3 0.328 0.408 0.397 0.433 
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 [0.59] [0.70] [0.68] [0.61] [0.62] [0.58] 
Observations 2077 2077 2077 2077 2077 2077 
P-values in brackets       
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level       
 
 3.2.2 Married men 
Figure 5 presents a histogram of ECA for married men age 62 or less. About 70% of the 
respondents report either age 62 or age 65, with both ages being equally likely in the sample. 
Most of the ECA are between 62 and 70, showing that a large proportion of married men have 
knowledge about possible claiming ages.  










50 55 60 65 70 75
eage7
 
Table 18 presents the results of the ordered probit using ECA as dependent variable. For 
all the specifications, we find that own survival has no impact on ECA. However, an important 
finding is that spouse’s survival has a positive and statistically significant coefficient for all the 
specifications. This is consistent with husbands trying to delay claiming so that their spouses 
enjoy higher survivor’s benefits. Similarly, we find that husbands with younger spouse are more 
likely expect to delay claiming. The coefficient of age difference between spouses is not 
statistically significant, though. Whether we use imputed P75 or not does not change the results.  
Contrarily to single men, we find that knowledge about SS rules impact the ECA, in 
particular married men who do not know that claiming early reduces SS benefits expect to claim 
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earlier. Like for singles and married women, work expectations are strong predictors of ECA. 
Financial variables seem more important for men than for women: men in the higher quartiles of 
wealth and SS wealth expect to claim earlier.  
 
Table 18: Ordered probit for married men (Dependent variable = ECA in 2004) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
P75 0.001 0.001  0 0  
 [0.52] [0.62]  [0.83] [0.97]  
P75- DK that claiming at 62 reduces SS   -0.001   -0.002 
   [0.73]   [0.50] 
P75 – know that claiming at 62 reduces SS   0.001   0.001 
   [0.35]   [0.53] 
P75 – knowledge question missing   0   0 
   [0.99]   [0.83] 
Spouse’s P75    0.003  0.003 
    [0.01]*  [0.01]** 
Spouse’s P75 missing    0.232  0.233 
    [0.07]  [0.07] 
Spouse’s P75 (with imputation)     0.003  
     [0.01]*  
Spouse’s P75 (with imputation)     0.289  
     [0.03]*  
DKreducSS1==1 - DK that claiming at 62 reduces SS  -0.367 -0.224  -0.385 -0.222 
  [0.00]** [0.26]  [0.00]** [0.26] 
DKreducSS1==2 - knowledge question missing  -0.049 0.045  -0.051 0.038 
  [0.58] [0.80]  [0.58] [0.83] 
Expect SS from spouse's record    -0.068 -0.021 -0.01 
    [0.87] [0.96] [0.98] 
Expect SS on both records    0.022 0.023 0.026 
    [0.80] [0.79] [0.76] 
DK which record    0.302 0.316 0.335 
    [0.58] [0.56] [0.54] 
ratio wife/husband benefits:50% - 99%    -0.036 -0.029 -0.027 
    [0.76] [0.81] [0.82] 
ratio wife/husband benefits: more than 100%    0.091 0.128 0.133 
    [0.46] [0.29] [0.28] 
ratio wife/husband benefits missing    -0.02 -0.014 -0.004 
    [0.84] [0.89] [0.97] 
Age -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
Spouses’ age difference 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008 
 [0.35] [0.36] [0.35] [0.20] [0.19] [0.19] 
Black -0.208 -0.187 -0.184 -0.195 -0.175 -0.168 
 [0.05]* [0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.10] [0.12] 
Hispanic 0.115 0.117 0.117 0.144 0.145 0.15 
 32
 [0.27] [0.26] [0.26] [0.17] [0.17] [0.15] 
2nd wealth quartile -0.026 -0.007 -0.006 -0.02 0.003 0.003 
 [0.75] [0.94] [0.94] [0.81] [0.97] [0.97] 
3rd wealth quartile -0.232 -0.217 -0.217 -0.235 -0.219 -0.219 
 [0.01]* [0.02]* [0.02]* [0.01]** [0.02]* [0.02]* 
4th wealth quartile -0.084 -0.07 -0.067 -0.087 -0.076 -0.07 
 [0.45] [0.53] [0.55] [0.44] [0.50] [0.53] 
Working for pay 1.051 1.047 1.033 1.036 1.023 0.999 
 [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] 
Own stock 0.166 0.158 0.157 0.159 0.152 0.148 
 [0.03]* [0.04]* [0.04]* [0.04]* [0.04]* [0.05] 
White collar job 0.134 0.119 0.117 0.128 0.112 0.111 
 [0.07] [0.11] [0.12] [0.08] [0.13] [0.14] 
Physical job -0.047 -0.055 -0.057 -0.039 -0.047 -0.048 
 [0.53] [0.46] [0.44] [0.59] [0.53] [0.52] 
Pension on current job -0.029 -0.032 -0.03 -0.021 -0.023 -0.02 
 [0.66] [0.64] [0.66] [0.75] [0.73] [0.77] 
Earnings 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.13] [0.10] [0.09] [0.14] [0.10] [0.11] 
Self-reported health –very good -0.091 -0.093 -0.094 -0.091 -0.093 -0.095 
 [0.26] [0.26] [0.25] [0.26] [0.26] [0.25] 
Self-reported health –good -0.193 -0.19 -0.189 -0.19 -0.186 -0.185 
 [0.02]* [0.03]* [0.03]* [0.03]* [0.03]* [0.03]* 
Self-reported health –fair -0.204 -0.188 -0.196 -0.208 -0.192 -0.199 
 [0.09] [0.11] [0.10] [0.08] [0.11] [0.10] 
Self-reported health –poor -0.659 -0.672 -0.672 -0.691 -0.705 -0.708 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
Prob working ft after 62 (P62) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
Prob working ft after 65 (P65) 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
2nd SS wealth quartile -0.056 -0.089 -0.091 -0.047 -0.076 -0.079 
 [0.64] [0.46] [0.45] [0.70] [0.53] [0.51] 
3rd SS wealth quartile -0.284 -0.327 -0.327 -0.27 -0.31 -0.308 
 [0.01]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.02]* [0.01]** [0.01]** 
4th SS wealth quartile -0.456 -0.51 -0.514 -0.43 -0.479 -0.478 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
SS wealth missing -0.166 -0.225 -0.225 -0.138 -0.194 -0.191 
 [0.11] [0.06] [0.06] [0.21] [0.11] [0.12] 
IRA wealth above median 0.093 0.087 0.085 0.086 0.081 0.077 
 [0.15] [0.18] [0.19] [0.19] [0.21] [0.24] 
P62 missing 1.28 1.252 1.252 1.296 1.27 1.268 
 [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** 
White collar job missing -0.181 -0.171 -0.166 -0.2 -0.193 -0.19 
 [0.67] [0.69] [0.70] [0.64] [0.65] [0.66] 
Physical job missing 0.191 0.19 0.167 0.172 0.157 0.135 
 [0.63] [0.63] [0.68] [0.67] [0.70] [0.74] 
Observations 1418 1418 1418 1418 1418 1418 
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P-values in brackets       
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level       
 
Conclusion 
There is substantial heterogeneity in the level of knowledge about SS rules according to 
demographic characteristics. The lack of knowledge among underprivileged groups, such as 
respondents without high-school degrees or Blacks, is of concern for the well-being of those 
groups in retirement, because they might rely heavily on SS benefits in old age.  
Our results suggest that individuals are responsive to the incentives provided by the SS 
rules. Single individuals take into account their survival expectations when deciding when to 
claim. Married individuals seem to make claiming plans to maximize the total lifetime amount 
the couple will receive from SS. This suggests that it is important to consider the incentives 
provided to couples—not just individuals—when evaluating the impact of various SS reforms. 
Women’s claiming decisions are importantly influenced by their level of knowledge. Given the 
fact that women are less knowledgeable than men, targeting education programs toward women 
is likely to have an impact on their claiming decisions.  
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